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Purpose: In  order  to  leverage  automation  control  data,  Industry  4.0  manufacturing  systems  require
industrial devices to be connected to the network. Potentially, this can increase the risk of  cyberattacks,
which can compromise connected industrial devices to acquire production data or gain control over the
production process. Search engines such as Sentient Hyper-Optimized Data Access Network (SHODAN)
can be perverted by attackers to acquire network information that can be later used for intrusion. To
prevent this, cybersecurity standards propose network architectures divided into several networks segments
based on system functionalities.  In this  architecture, Firewalls  limit  the exposure of  industrial control
devices in order to minimize security risks. This paper presents a novel Software Defined Networking
(SDN)  Firewall  that  automatically  applies  this  standard  architecture  without  compromising  network
flexibility.
Design/methodology/approach: The  proposed  SDN  Firewall  changes  filtering  rules  in  order  to
implement  the  different  network segments  according to application level  access control  policies.  The
Firewall applies two filtering techniques described in this paper: temporal filtering and spatial filtering, so
that only applications in a white list can connect to industrial control devices. Network administrators need
only to configure this application-oriented white lists to comply with security standards for ICS. This
simplifies  to  a  great  extent  network  management  tasks.  Authors  have  developed  a  prototype
implementation based on the OPC UA Standard and conducted security tests in order to test the viability
of  the proposal.
Findings: Network  segmentation  and  segregation  are  effective  counter-measures  against  network
scanning  attacks.  The proposed SDN Firewall  effectively  configures  a  flat  network into virtual  LAN
segments according to security standard guidelines. 
Research limitations/implications: The prototype  implementation  still  needs  to implement  several
features to exploit  the full  potential  of  the proposal.  Next steps  for development are discussed in a
separate section. 
Practical  implications: The  proposed  SDN  Firewall  has  similar  security  features  to  commercially
available application Firewalls, but SDN Firewalls offer additional security features. First, SDN technology
provides  improved performance,  since  SDN low-level  processing  functions  are  much more  efficient.
Second, with SDN, security functions are rooted in the network instead of  being centralized in particular
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network elements. Finally, SDN provides a more flexible and dynamic, zero configuration framework for
secure manufacturing systems by automating the rollout of  security standard-based network architectures.
Social implications: SDN Firewalls can facilitate the deployment of  secure Industry 4.0 manufacturing
systems,  since  they  provide  ICS  networks  with  many  of  the  needed  security  capabilities  without
compromising flexibility.
Originality/value: The  paper  proposes  a  novel  SDN  Firewall  specifically  designed  to  secure  ICS
networks.  A prototype implementation of  the  proposed SDN Firewall  has  been tested in  laboratory
conditions.  The  prototype  implementation  complements  the  security  features  of  the  OPC  UA
communication standard to provide a holistic security framework for ICS networks.
Keywords: cyber security, CPS, MES, SDN, OPC UA
1. Introduction
The concept of  Cyber-Physical System (CPS) (Baheti, 2015) is rapidly reshaping the manufacturing sector. CPSs
interconnects  (cyber)  computational  assets  with  physical  assets  through  devices  with  computational  and
communication capabilities. These devices turn physical objects into smart components conforming distributed and
autonomous ecosystems that can sense and interact with the physical word, as well as with other software systems.
Thus, CPSs are feedback systems that fuse the real world and the cyber world, providing new knowledge from
connected devices. Because of  the endless possibilities and expandability of  CPSs, their applications have been
explored  in  various  research  fields,  including  manufacturing  (Lee,  Bagheri  &  Kao,  2015).  Indeed,  the
implementation of  CPSs in manufacturing factories provides many advantages, from advanced fault detection for
maintenance operations to work and waste reductions for lean manufacturing operations. For this reason, CPS is
regarded as one of  the core elements of  the next generation paradigm for the manufacturing industry, Industry 4.0
(Kagermann, Wahlster & Helbig, 2013). 
CPSs are a core element for industrial companies to implement vertical integration and networked manufacturing
systems, where the different hierarchical levels (from the operational level to the corporate planning level) are able
to share information in real time far beyond any traditional Manufacturing Execution Systems (MES). MES are
intermediate systems between Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and enterprise applications (Kletti, 2006) and are
crucial systems to materialize vertical integration.
However, enhancing IT system interconnectivity can expose process control devices like Program Logic Controllers
(PLC)  to  cyber-attacks.  Attackers  may  compromise  devices  to  disturb  production  (Smith,  2015),  but  also,  as
highlighted in the report from the Repository of  Industrial Security Incidents (RISI, 2017), to conform botnets and
direct massive distributed attacks to other systems. Clearly, if  a cyberattack shutdowns manufacturing operations,
companies can lose large amounts of  money, but most importantly, cyberattacks targeting systems that require
safety operations represent a serious hazard to the safety of  operators. Therefore, CPSs require thorough design
and implementation of  IT Security measures. 
Moreover, towards the realization of  secured vertical integration, IT network configuration rules need to be defined
in a flexible manner, depending on the status of  the manufacturing process (Kagermann et al., 2013), in order to
minimize security threads. Software Defined Network (SDN) is likely a key technology in this regard (Nunes,
Mendonca,  Nguyen,  Obraczka  &  Turletti,  2014),  since  it  allows  to  control  the  network  architecture
programmatically, making it possible to modify network access on demand and minimize the exposure of  ICS
networks to attackers. 
Software Defined Networking Firewalls have been introduced in the literature (Satasiya, 2016). In this paper, a
protective network structure with a novel SDN Firewall specifically designed for industrial networks is proposed.
The authors propose the concept of  protective network structure for manufacturing systems and an access control
mechanism implemented with a specialized SDN Firewall based on the Open Networking Foundation OpenFlow
specification (2017). 
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Thus, the research is focused on protecting the network against attacks based on Network Scanning/Probing, since
it is one of  the major causes of  security incidents in industry, according to research by the National Cybersecurity
and Communications Integration Center  (ICS-CERT, n.d.).  SHODAN (Shodan,  SHODAN Industrial Control
Systems, 2017) or other network scanning tools can be used to conduct this kind of  network scanning attacks
(Bodenheim, Butts, Dunlap & Mullins, 2014). As a countermeasure, network segmentation with appropriate access
rules  can  reduce  the  risk  of  unauthorized  computer  access.  In  this  paper,  in  order  to  improve  security  in
manufacturing systems, the following three objectives are established.
• Objective 1: Create segments without reconfiguring existing networks. Industrial devices are required to
keep running constantly for safety operations. On the other hand, the ICS network should be separated
with a defense-in-depth strategy -a common strategy that uses layers of  firewalls to protect ICS- in order
to check cyberattacks at an upper layer network. Therefore, DMZ is recommended to implement vertical
integration without compromising security. However, changing the existing network may result in loss of
availability  of  automation  equipment.  Authors  propose  a  mechanism which  enables  networks  to  be
changed into ideal networks without reconfiguration in order to implement a defense-in depth-strategy. 
• Objective 2: Develop unidirectional access mechanisms. In order to protect industrial control systems, it is
necessary to establish mechanisms that allow access to servers only when clients require the connection.
This technique is  known as unidirectional access mechanisms. Since lower networks, such as separate
Control LANs, need to be interconnected, unidirectional communication is highly recommended (Agence
Nationale de la Sécurité de Systems d’Information (ANSSI), 2014). 
• Objective  3:  Reduce  loopholes  in  access  rules.  Machine-to-Machine  (M2M)  standards  like  OPC UA
(Mahnke, Leitner & Damm 2009) enable communications with control devices and implement several
security policies like authentication. However, security under transport layer is not covered by the OPC UA
security specifications. Conversely, firewalls comprehend security for lower level communication layers.
Therefore, firewall access rules and OPC UA security are complementary security measures for vertical
integration of  enterprise and industrial systems. However, the control of  access rules between enterprise
network and the industrial network is complex due to the different business functionality of  each zone. For
instance, devices are frequently introduced or exchanged in enterprise zone while they are more or less
static in the manufacturing zone. This may lead to loopholes in firewall access rules. 
In order to present the proposed solution, the rest of  the paper is organized as follows: First, Section 2 includes a
literature review of  key existing systems and technologies for vertical integration in manufacturing systems. The
literature review also covers the main cyberattack threats against industrial networks and the main countermeasures
and technologies for cybersecurity. Section 3 presents the proposed network structure and the proposed SDN
Firewall to mitigate security risks. Discussions are presented in Section 4, including the prototype implementation
and the results of  the security scanning tests. Finally, Section 5 includes some final remarks.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Industrial Control Systems and Networks
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is a comprehensive term to describe the many applications and uses of  facility
control and automation systems in industry. ISA-99/IEC 62443 (International Electrotecnical Commission (IEC),
2009) is  using the  term Industrial  Automation and Control  Systems with following definition:  “collection of
personnel,  hardware,  and software  that  can affect  or  influence the  safe,  secure,  and reliable  operation of  an
industrial process”.
Traditional ICSs architectures were closed systems. Industrial control systems started to incorporate networking at
different levels to enable the connection between different manufacturing assets in order to improve the monitoring
and control functions of  the system. According to the National Institute of  Standards and Technology (NIST,
2006), Industrial Network components can be classified into the following categories:
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• Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs): PLC are specialised devices that control industrial equipment and
processes  through digital  and/or  analogue  input  and  output  interfaces.  PLCs  have  reliable,  real-time
runtimes to execute closed-loop control programs and are the core of  every industrial control system. 
• Supervisory  Control  and  Data  acquisition  (SCADA):  SCADA systems  are  software  systems  used  to
monitor and control geographically dispersed manufacturing assets. 
• Distributed Control Systems (DCS): DCSs are integrated control architectures containing a supervisory
level of  control overseeing multiple, integrated subsystems that are responsible for controlling the details
of  localized processes. The main difference between SCAD2.4A and DCSs systems and that functionalities
of  DCSs are limited to display the current status of  manufacturing assets,  whereas SCADA systems
implement event-driven control mechanisms. 
Additionally, Human Machine Interfaces (HMI) are Graphical User Interfaces implementing human interactions
with industrial network components. 
Communications between these components occur at two different network levels (Sauter, 2010), the Local Area
Network (LAN) and the Field Area Networks. Although there are several fieldbus technologies that can still be
found  in  factories,  both  networks  are  rapidly  migrating  towards  Ethernet-based  networks,  in  some  cases
incorporating wireless access. Switched Ethernet networks lead to simpler physical network configurations and the
technology is becoming very cost-efficient, due to the large economies of  scale. End-to-end Ethernet networks
favour system interoperability, since all corporate systems can be interconnected in the same physical network. In
this context, communications between industrial network components are supported by IP industrial Machine to
Machine (M2M) as described in the following section. 
2.2. Industrial Machine to Machine (M2M) Protocols
Industrial Machine to Machine (M2M) communication protocols provide support for networking and data transfer
in industrial  control networks.  The proliferation of  Ethernet-based field buses and networks has fostered the
appearance of  different M2M protocols. Due to the strict timing requirements of  industrial control applications,
many manufacturers have developed communication protocols optimized for their industrial control equipment.
This is the case of  the Automation Device Specification (ADS) Protocol from Beckoff. Some of  these proprietary
protocols, originally developed by private companies, were later adopted by standard organizations and achieved
larger  market  presence  and  vendor  independence.  This  is  the  case  of  the  CANOpen  (Bosch),  DeviceNet
(Rockwell), or Profinet (Siemens) communication protocols. Similarly, the OLE for Process Control (OPC) was
developed from Microsoft Windows Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) to allow the development of
Microsoft applications interconnecting Industrial control components. The OPC protocol later evolved into the
OPC Unified Architecture (OPC UA) protocol, providing support to the development of  platform independent
OPC UA based applications, enabling the development of  industrial control applications in platforms like Linux or
Android.  OPC UA is  becoming  the  de-facto standard  for  M2M communications  in  industrial  environments.
MTConnect is another protocol which, like OPC UA, has been designed to promote interoperability to exchange
data between industrial  network components.  On the other hand,  TCP Modbus is  another open standard to
exchange industrial control data which is widely used in industry.
As corporate applications migrate to cloud platforms or hybrid private-cloud platforms, industrial M2M need to
provide support to Internet communications. This Internet capable M2M protocols are an important cornerstone
of  the Industry 4.0 and Industrial Internet of  Things (IIoT) concepts. In this sense, the OPC UA protocol provides
two different protocol stacks, a tcp-based protocol stack designed to work in private networks and an HTTPS
protocol  stack  that  can  be  used  over  the  Internet.  The  Message  Queue  Telemetry  Transport  (MQTT)  is  a
publish-subscribe messaging protocol that is optimized to reduce communications overhead and consume as little
bandwidth as possible. MQTT is widely used in both IoT and IIoT applications. The Constrained Application
Protocol (CoAP) and the Lightweight Machine to Machine (LWM2M) protocols are alternatives to MQTT also
backed by strong standardization bodies. Finally, the WebThings protocol is a M2M protocol specifically designed
to bridge the gap between devices and web applications, by using web compatible technologies like websockets. 
Finally, Table 1 summarizes the different protocols presented in this section.
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Table 1. Industrial M2M machine protocols
M2M Protocols play an important role in vertical integration, since they enable interoperability between industrial
network components and other systems in the corporate level. Manufacturing Execution Systems (MES) play an
important role in this integration and for this reason they are described in the following section.
2.3. Manufacturing Execution Systems (MES)
Manufacturing Execution System (MES) are intermediate systems between ICSs and corporate applications like the
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP). A detailed description of  MES functions can be found in the ISA 95 standard
(American  National  Standard,  2005),  which  is  based  on  a  three-level  structure:  Corporate  Management,
Manufacturing  Operation  System (MOS) MES/MOM  and  Process  Control  level.  ISA  95  part  3 (American
National Standard, 2005) defines the interfaces to interact with the process control level to integrate corporate
management  systems  and  process  control  systems  in  the  following  activities:  process  execution,  definition
management, data collection, dispatching, analysis, resource management, detailed scheduling and tracking. 
Through  this  integration,  the  MES  model  provides  significant  advantages  in  comparison  with  the  classical
manufacturing model. First, MES/MOM improves the transparency of  the manufacturing data. Sensor data can be
used to calculate production Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in real time or to monitor the status of  the
machines and the quality of  the manufacturing process. The integration with enterprise data gives sense to this
information,  relating it  to  specific  products  and assets,  providing the ability  to  map the  value stream of  the
company in real time. This information improves the responsiveness of  the organization to detect problems and
unplanned events, becoming able to correct errors and adapt to the demand more rapidly. This vertical integration
fosters networking between the tactical level and the operational level, encouraging inter-company cooperation and
enabling a faster and more effective exchange of  information between levels. According to Kletti (2016), MES
systems can be regarded as decision support systems developed from classic disciplines such as production data
acquisition, operator work time logging, or quality assurance. 
Moreover, the Manufacturing Execution Solution Association (MESA, n.d.) defines twelve function groups which
are  required for an effective  decision support  of  production management:  (1)  detailed planning,  (2)  resource
management (3) registration and display of  the current status of  resources, (4) document management, (5) material
management,  (6)  performance  analysis,  (7)  order  management,  (8)  maintenance  management,  (9)  process
management,  (10)  quality  management,  (11)  data  collection  and  acquisition  and  (12)  product  tracking  and
genealogy. MESA has also established the terms Collaborative MES (C-MES) and Advanced Collaborative MES
(ACMES) to refer to redesigned and modified functions for supply networks. 
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A more detailed definition of  the functions of  MES systems can be found in ISA 95 standard (American
National Standard, 2005). ISA 95 is based on a three-level structure: corporate management,  Manufacturing
Operation System (MOS)/MES and process control level. ISA 95 part 3 (American National Standard, 2005)
defines the interfaces between enterprise activities and control  activities.  In the document, a generic activity
model of  production operations management shows several activities which interact with the process control
level: (1) execution, (2) definition management, (3) data collection, (4) dispatching, (5) analysis,  (6) re-source
management,  (7)  detailed scheduling and (8)  tracking.  Equipment and process  specific  production rules  are
applied  to  process  control  level  with  product  definition  management.  The  rules  are  downloaded  to  the
equipment such as PLC in order to change process. Operational commands and responses are interacted with
production execution. Operational commands are information to command production steps to personnel or
equipment  which  belong  to  process  control  level.  And,  operational  responses  are  obtained  from  them to
managers  who  execute  production  execution  for  next  decision.  Equipment  and  process  data  which  is
in-formation about the equipment performing and the production functions is acquired from process control
level for production data collection. As to a boundary between MES and corporate management level, the model
is  classified into four types depending on operation mode,  which are  maintenance,  production,  quality  and
inventory. 
2.4. Security in ICS and Manufacturing Systems
2.4.1. The challenges of  Network Probing Attacks
Attackers compromise devices to disturb production by exploiting different system vulnerabilities. According to
ICS CERT (ICS), attackers commonly follow three steps to compromise devices running in industrial control
networks. The first step is to gain access to the control system LAN. After that, attackers try to understand the
communication mechanisms implemented in the system to perform specific attacks to the devices. Finally, they
compromise a device. The main objectives of  cyberattacks are to gain control over the process, to hack the Human
Machine Interface (HMI), to change the database, or to perform other attacks with Man-in-the-Middle. 
In  order  to  intrude  a  control  system LAN,  Sentient  Hyper-Optimized  Data  Access  Network  (SHODAN)
(Shodan,  2017),  which  is  a  search  engine  for  Internet  connected  devices,  can  be  perverted  by  attackers.
SHODAN provides users with IP addresses, Hostnames, domain information, positional information, service
ports, Operating System (OS), banner (device-specific) information, and the date of  registration. The banner is
especially sensitive since it includes information such as default password, which can be used to compromise a
device. (Bodenheim et al. 2014) shows the impact of  SHODAN attacks in industrial networks. Figure 1 contains
the flow chart of  SHODAN device scans. As shown in the figure, SHODAN generates a random IP address and
service port to carry out a Synchronize (SYN) scan. If  the SYN/Acknowledge (ACK) flag is received from an
opponent,  the  SYN  scan  is  regarded  as  success.  Then,  SHODAN  starts  to  grab  opponent’s  information
(banner). After that, SHODAN stores this information in the database and repeats this scan for all IP addresses
in the provided range. 
Figure 1. SHODAN scanning flow chart
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This paper presents a security solution to mitigate the risk of  network probing attacks. The proposed solution is
encompassed in standard cybersecurity frameworks and architectures for industrial control networks which are
described in the following sections. 
2.4.2. Cybersecurity Framework in Manufacturing Systems
Cybersecurity  models  for  manufacturing  systems  should  regard  different  aspects  beyond  technical  security
requirements  and  functionalities.  In  this  sense,  The  US  Department  of  Homeland  Security  (DHS)  (2016a)
developed a specialized framework for critical industrial systems. The DHS framework presents a comprehensive
set of  functions that provide a strategic overview of  the different activities in the cybersecurity lifecycle:
• Identify: Lay the foundation for effective use of  the framework. Cybersecurity practices in the Identify
Function include systems, assets, data, capabilities, and other foundational elements that are critical to the
organization. 
• Protect: Develop and identify appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of  critical infrastructure services. 
• Detect: Identify and implement the tools to identify the occurrence of  a cybersecurity incident. 
• Respond: Use the tools and activities to support the containment of  a cybersecurity event. 
• Recover: Bolster resilience and restore any capabilities or services impaired by the cybersecurity event. 
The National Institute of  Standards and Technology (NIST) guide to ICS Security (Stouffer et al. 2014) on the
other hand groups activities in two main phases: risk management and assessment and ICS Security Program
development  and  deployment.  Furthermore,  according  to  the  Agence  Nationale  de  la  Sécurité  de  Systems
d’Information (ANSSI), industrial control systems can be categorized into three types depending on the risks and
impact of  attacks (ANSSI 2014).
The  ISA-99/IEC  62443  (IEC,  2009)  Industrial  Network  and  System  Security  standards,  which  are  under
development at the time of  writing this report, builds upon these standards and proposes four different categories
to group standardization activities: 
• General:  Definition of  main concepts  and models,  security  lifecycle  and use cases  and conformance
metrics. 
• Policies and procedures: Requirements and guidance for security management systems, patch management
and requirements for solution providers. 
• System: Technologies, system security requirements, security level and security risk assessment and security
system design. 
• Component:  Product  development  and  technical  security  requirement  for  industrial  control  network
components 
The Virtual  Factory  Operating  System (vf-OS)  project  develops a  security  model  which complies  with these
standards and that it is based on security architectures for industrial control networks which are further described in
the next subsection.
2.4.3. Secure Architecture for Industrial Control Networks
In order to minimise the risk of  cyberattacks against industrial control network components, the different standard
organizations presented in the previous sections recommend network segmentation and segregation in order to
minimize the access from one segment to other segments. This technique minimises the risk of  exposing sensitive
information of  industrial network composes to network probing attacks. Indeed, from a security point of  view, the
ideal  situation  would  be  to  keep the  industrial  control  network  completely  isolated,  but,  as  discussed  in  the
introduction, this would limit system interconnectivity and limit the functionalities and scope of  CPS and MES
systems. In order to enable interconnectivity, standards propose the use of  specialised network architectures for
industrial control networks (Stouffer, Pillitteri, Lightman, Abrams & Hahn, 2014; ANSSI, 2014; IEC, 2009) based
on the Defence in-Depth strategy (DHS, 2016b; Barnum, Gegick & Michael, 2005). With this strategy, security
systems are not concentrated in a single network point, but scattered across the network, so that potential attackers
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meet  several  burdens  before  they  can  compromise  the  industrial  control  network.  The main  security  system
recommended in all standards to implement this security strategy is Firewalls, which control the network traffic in
and out every network segment. The DHS secure ICS network architecture divides the network into two zones
(and five subnetworks depending on business functions. The different subnetworks are interconnected through
Firewalls  which  prevent  untrusted  traffic  in  every  subnetwork  and  implement  the  access  rules  to  enable
interoperability  between  the  different  business  functions  within  each  zone.  The  ISA/IEC 62443  secure  ICS
network architecture, illustrated in Figure 2, uses the same approach and defines different levels for the industrial (ie
manufacturing) zone, the operation, the control and the field level. This approach is adopted in state-of-the-art
interoperability platforms such as vf-OS. 
Figure 2. Zone segmentation of  Enterprise & ICS (ISA/IEC 62443)
Thus, an attacker pretending to intrude the control network, needs to generate traffic that meets the security
filtering rules programmed into each Firewall in the different security levels. In this sense, (Byres, Karsch & Carter,
2005) categorizes a firewall into several types depending on the type of  filtering rules that can be applied. Most
advanced Firewalls implement in-depth packet inspection, allowing to deploy application layer filtering rules, so that
only traffic matching specific application level rules can access the network. This makes it possible to integrate
network security  rules with application layer  security  mechanisms. Next section describes the application level
security  mechanisms  provided  by  the  OPC  UA  standard,  since  is  the  technology  used  in  the  prototype
implementation of  the proposed solution. 
2.4.4. OPC UA Security
The OPC UA security specifications are described in (OPC Foundation, 2015; Amstrong & Hunkar, 2010). Figure
3 shows the OPC UA security architecture. The figure highlights how the security addresses three layers of  the OSI
Model (Boait, Neville, Norris, Pickman, Tolhurst & Walmsley, 1988) above the network layer: The application layer,
the communication layer and the transport layer. At the Application layer, Authentication and Authorization are
required to allow access only to trusted clients. OPC UA applications have Application Instance Certificates to
implement  certificate  based  application  layer  security.  At  the  communication  layer,  data  encryption  provides
confidentiality  to  prevent  eavesdropping.  Finally,  other  mechanisms  achieve  data  integrity  and  transport  layer
security to prevent data loss. 
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Figure 3. OPC UA security architecture (UA Part2)
3. Sample and Methods
3.1. MES Network with Transparent Firewall
Figure 4 shows the MES system network architecture with the transparent SDN Firewall proposed in this paper.
The SDN Firewall has two main functions: First, to filter packets based on access rules and second, to act as a
bridge between network interfaces. With packet filtering – based on application layer rules, IP rules or Medium
Access Control  (MAC) layer rules – industrial devices can be grouped into the appropriate network segment
automatically. On the other hand, bridging allows to implement the firewall without changing the existing network
configuration.  It  can  be  noted  that  the  proposal  is  still  compatible  with  the  aforementioned  standards  and
recommendations, except that security functions are not implemented at the boundaries of  the different levels.
Instead, each system boundary faces other system boundaries through a SDN Firewall, programming the security
functions in the network, thus taking the defence in-depth strategy to a new level. 
Figure 4. Secure manufacturing system architecture with SDN Firewalls
Figure 4 shows the different functional levels of  manufacturing systems and industrial control networks with the
proposed SDN Firewall. The SDN Firewall limits access to PLCs or any other Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS)
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by  applying  the  different  rules  and  only  allowing  access  to  well-known  services  (eg  MES  systems  or  CPS
components). The following sections describe two different filtering techniques that can be used to implement
SDN Firewalls. 
3.2. Temporal Filtering
The access rules in the proposed SDN Firewall are only enabled when a connection is required. This feature,
known as temporal filtering, is implemented with OpenFlow. The SDN Firewall consists of  two components, the
actual  Firewall  operating in the data plane of  every system boundary (hereafter Transparent Firewall)  and the
control plane (hereafter Firewall Controller) controlling the behaviour of  the Transparent Firewall. This way, The
Transparent Firewall enforces access rules, allowing clients to connect to servers when packets match all the rules
that have been defined and dropping packets that do not match access rules. The firewall controller keeps the
configuration of  the manufacturing system network and enables/disables access rules in the Transparent Firewall
accordingly. 
Figure 5. Communication sequence of  packet filtering
The communication sequence of  temporal filtering is depicted in Figure 5. When a client requires connection to a
server, the Transparent Firewall intercepts the packet and inspects the packet headers. The packet is dropped if  it
does not match the rules set by the Firewall Controller. Otherwise, the packet is kept on the Transparent Firewall
and a message is sent the Firewall Controller in order to request instructions on how to deal with the packet. When
the Firewall Controller receives the message, the Firewall controller checks the information against the overall
security rules and adds new match rules if  the packet is allowed to pass through the Transparent Firewall, Then, the
Firewall Controller sends a Packet Out message with the corresponding instructions so that the Firewall forwards
the withheld packet to the server. The red arrows depicted in Figure 5 represent the Three-way handshaking that
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establishes TCP/IP communications. If  there is no communication for a certain time, the Firewall deletes the
added match rules and the instructions. Therefore, the Firewall controller only allows connections to servers when
specific clients in a whitelist try to establish a connection. The rest of  the time, all communications are virtually
closed.
3.3. Spatial Filtering
In addition to temporal filtering, the Transparent Firewall implements an Access Control system based on the OPC
UA standard. Since the Transparent Firewall virtually separates networks based on access rules programed in the
Firewall Controller, it is possible to automatically rewrite the access rules based on OPC UA application level
authorization. This novel mechanism is referred to as spatial filtering. An illustrative structure of  spatial filtering is
depicted in Figure 6. The steps for setting access rules are described as follows:
1. The OPC UA Access Control Server (ACS) requests OPC UA Applications information about their trust
list and network interfaces. The Firewall Controller must allow the ACS to pass through the Firewall in
advance. 
2. OPC UA applications send trust lists and network interfaces to the ACS. 
3. The ACS generates the access control list with this information. 
4. The  Firewall  Controller  configuration  is  updated.  The  access  control  list  must  be  downloaded  with
encrypted communication to protect the system information from external attackers. 
5. The Firewall applies temporal filtering according to the access control list implemented in the Firewall
Controller. 
Figure 6. Structure of  spatial filtering mechanism
This way, the Transparent Firewall flexibly filters packets depending on trusted applications and enabled network
interfaces in OPC UA applications.
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4. Discussion
4.1. Prototype implementation
Authors have developed a prototype SDN Firewall implementation as described in this paper. A system structure
of  the prototype implementation is shown in Figure 7. An OPC UA server application (KEP Server EX, 2017) and
tOPC UA client application (UaExpert, 2017) are installed on Windows based virtual machines (Guest machine1
and  Guest  machine  2)  in  order  to  test  the  solution.  The  Transparent  Firewall  has  been  implemented  with
OpenVSSwitch (Openvswitch, 2017) and the Firewall Controller with Trema (Trema, 2017) and run on virtual
Linux machines (Guest machine 3).  The Access Control Server is developed on a Linux virtual based (Guest
machine 4). The virtual network consists of  three LAN segments simulating the presented secure industrial control
network architecture. The Firewall and the Firewall Controller internally communicate with Local Loopback. The
Firewall Controller download a file containing the access rules from the Access Control Server. They use shared key
to communicate each other by using the Secure Shell (SSH) connection. Firewall Controller downloads a set of
match rules. In this version, the rules are based on service, IP and MAC level information. The Firewall Controller
provides logs to describe information of  the status of  the Firewall and filtering results. Figure 8 shows the console
interface of  the Firewall Controller.
Figure 7. Prototype implementation structure
Figure 8. Firewall Controller’s console
4.2. Security Test
Authors tested how the Firewall works against network scans. Two conditions were conducted on the prototype
system. One is security scan with the SDN Firewall disabled, ie the Firewall runs as a legacy Ethernet switch. The
second part of  the test, the scan is performed with the SDN Firewall applying the filtering rules. The Nmap (2017)
scanning tool was shown in the tests, scanning information of  port status and OS from the Guest machine 2.
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Then, service ports for Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) (port number 3389) and the OPC UA Server application
(port number 49320) are opened in the Guest machine 1. 
The results are illustrated in Figure 9. When the firewall is disabled, the ports were opened and several expected OS
versions are shown. On the other hand, when the SDN Firewall is enabled the application ports were closed and no
details of  OS were displayed. As a consequence, the SDN Firewall did not expose Guest machine 1 port status or
OS details  regardless of  its  access rules.  Therefore,  the Firewall  can be regarded as a secure measure against
network scanning.
Figure 9. Comparison of  results
4.3. Next Steps
The  prototype  implementation  is  an  early  implementation  that  works  as  a  Stateful  Firewall.  Currently,  the
configuration is performed manually. In the next steps, authors need to focus on two main tasks. The first task is to
develop more automatic spatial filtering mechanisms. With this purpose, authors need to continue to develop the
Access  Control  Server  based on the  OPC UA standard.  Authors  need also  tackling  the  development  of  an
algorithm  for  automatically  generate  access  rules.  The  second  task  is  to  develop  more  sophisticated  packet
inspection mechanisms to secure even more OPC UA communications.
5. Conclusions
Cybersecurity is a critical aspect of  MES systems and other CPS systems for Manufacturing. Most common attacks
are  based  on  Network  Scanning/Probing.  Defence-in-depth  is  an  effective  counter-measure  against  scanning
attacks. This paper has presented a manufacturing system network architecture based on this security strategy. The
network architecture implements a novel SDN Firewall that features temporal filtering (packets are only allowed
from authorised clients when they need communications) and spatial filtering (access control list is integrated with
OPC UA Application level authorization). This way, the ICS network is virtually closed for Network Scanning or
Probing. Additionally, the SDN Firewall is able to separate a flat network into the proposed manufacturing system
network architecture without loss of  network availability. 
An implementation prototype has been developed and tested in a virtual network. The prototype firewall has been
tested together with OPC-UA client and OPC UA server applications exchanging machine data. Access from the
OPC UA client to the OPC UA server is only allowed by temporal filtering firewall. Test results showed that the
firewall could prevent security scanners from acquiring the application port and other Operating System level
details of  the OPC UA server. The prototype implementation implemented Transport layer filters, although authors
plan to develop a more sophisticated SDN Firewall implementing deep packet inspection for OPC UA. This could
potentially improve security and performance. Regarding spatial filtering, authors regarded using the standard OPC
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Discovery Service, but this service lacked Discovery information for client applications, so further research needs
to be conducted in order to automatically generate access lists. 
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